What is the relationship between images of the body (thoughts, memories, concepts, visual perceptions, etc.) and the so-called material body itself?

A moment’s reflection reveals that naive realism can’t be true: the image of the body is not the material body. For example, the image in the mirror is a representation of the material body. And a representation–a copy, a similitude–is not the thing in itself.

Then is the image of the material body an accurate representation of the material body?

The natural first answer is: I don’t know.

Then how could I verify that the image of the body (which occurs “in the mind”) resembles the material body that is believed to exist in its own right?

Case 1: Suppose I keep namarupa (“name and form”). Am I able to check my visual perception “against” the material body in itself in order to ascertain whether there is a significant resemblance? No, obviously not: I can’t reach outside of experience–here, perception–in order to perform this check. Besides, if I could reach the material body directly, then this whole investigation would be mute, that is, unnecessary.

Well, can I check (a) visual perception #1 against (b) memory thought of this visual perception #2? It seems as if I should be able to, but I actually can’t.

Why not?

Because when the visual perception #1 is present at time T1 the memory thought is not present. And when memory thought #2 is present at T2 the visual perception is not present. Therefore, I can never get them “close enough” to properly ascertain whether they resemble one another.

And even if I could, the resemblance between two experiences “in the mind” would still tell me nothing about whether they are accurately “carrying the information” from the material body itself into experience #1 (the visual perception) and then into experience #2 (the memory thought).

Therefore, Case 1 is a dead-end.

Case 2: Suppose I remove namarupa, i.e., all names and forms. Then what am I left with?

I’m not aware of a ding an sich, that is, a thing in itself. I’m only aware of Presence. And Presence is not a bounded thing.

Therefore, my inquiry into how I could confirm or disconfirm the resemblance or likeness thesis comes up empty.

Perhaps what’s worth questioning, then, is the very question itself: What if the concept of a material body were nothing but a function of the mind that then projected the independent existence of the so-called material body beyond the bounds of its own activity? What if, to quote Wittgenstein, a “picture held us captive”?

What would it be like to let go of–or at least to begin loosening up–the belief and feeling that my material body exists?