The whole universe appears as a superimposition on the Real Self, the Substratum, which is the Reality and hence it is not like a man’s horn. But it is taught that it is not real in its own right.
–K. Lakshmana Sarma, “Verse 194,” The Supreme Science As Taught By Sri Ramana, p. 106.
The question often asked of Advaita Vedanta is: “In what sense can be said that ‘the world is unreal’”? Sarma goes on to parse a distinction in his brief commentary on this verse, noting that the “utterly unreal” refers to whatever is “never conceivable as real” (p. 106-7) whereas the other kind, the kind indicated above, “can and does appear as real like the rope snake” (p. 107).
What does this distinction amount to? Beginning with the doubt (or objection) may be helpful. “How can you say that the world is unreal since I can definitely see it? And are you telling me that the Sage doesn’t see what I see? If so, then what does He see?”
The first thing to get straight about is the standard of reality employed by Advaita Vedanta. It is not “whatever can be perceived by the senses” but rather “whatever is changeless, self-shining, and ontologically independent.”
Why don’t sense perceptions count? Because, to begin with, sense perceptions in the waking state differ from those in the dream state. And, secondly, the claim that realists make is that sense perceptions are “veridical” insofar as the content of the independently existing world is somehow confirmed by our perceptions of this content (i.e., by the actual experience). Yet, in truth, all that we can really say for certain–until there’s a direct perception of nondual truth–is that there’s “something” “beyond” whatever our sense perceptions are immediately revealing, “something” out of which these sense perceptions are made.
Having rejected whatever is perceived by the senses as our standard of reality, we can now turn to the Vedantic standard. It’s clear that the world is not real in the Vedantic three-fold sense because (a) it’s changeable, (b) it’s not self-luminous but rather borrows its light from consciousness, and (c) it’s not ontologically independent but instead depends, for conceptualizing, upon the mind and, more basically, for its “arisingness at all” upon witnessing consciousness.
And now we’re in a position to meet the objection presented above. To say that “the world is unreal” is not to say that it’s like a square circle. Not only is the world conceivable; it’s certainly appearing–as an appearance. (*)
However, (1) what the world really is is not what it purports to be. It’s in this first sense that it’s unreal. The very substance of the world is not matter or energy but is instead being-consciousness.
And (2) the world purports to be an independently existing entity (“real in its own right”), and this too is untrue. The world is never experienced when one is in the dream state or, indeed, in the state of deep sleep. If the world were independently existing, then wouldn’t it “show itself” in both of these states? Moreover, if it were independently existing, then how come we never find it either in the absence of conceptual mind (no mind, no name-and-form world) and, most especially, in the absence of witnessing consciousness by whose light it can appear at all (if there were no witnessing consciousness, then there would be no appearances period).
In sum, the world is unreal insofar as the manner in which it appears is not what it truly is (which is sat, or being) and insofar as it’s not independently existing but is instead dependent upon what is “ontologically prior” (mind, if one wishes to speak in terms of names and forms; the witness, if one wishes to speak in terms of witness and mere forms [arisings]).
I’ll conclude with the essential point, which can often get lost when we dig into doctrinal matters at some length. This is that the teaching–“The world is unreal”–is urging us to turn inward so that we can come to discover what is truly real. In the end, it will be experientially understood that the world is indeed real qua Self.
Endnote
(*) Technically, “the world” is not appearing. What is appearing is this sight, this sound, this texture, this flavor, or this scent. Or technically, “the world” is only appearing as an idea or concept–like: “The world is the unity of which the plurality of sense experiences are mere aspects or expressions.” Of course, the proposal that the world is an idea or concept would take us into an nondual inquiry, which would show that all ideas or concepts are mere arisings that are appearing to witnessing consciousness. Etc.